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Abstract In this empirical study, we investigate the
variation in firms’ response to institutional pressure for
gender-balanced boards, focusing specifically on the
preservation of prevailing practices of director selection
and its impact on the representation of women on the
board of directors. Using 8 years of data from publicly
listed Nordic corporations, we show societal pressure to
be one of the determinants of female directorship.
Moreover, in some corporations, the director selection
process may work to maintain ‘‘a traditional type of
board’’. In such boards, demographic diversity among
male members appears to be associated with a lower share
of female directors, although we cannot establish wether
this reflects discrimination or a desire to maintain critical
competencies. With this paper we add to the theoretical
understanding of the factors underlying female board
appointments by adopting an institutional theory lens to
study female board representation. Viewing the demands
for gender-balanced boards in terms of societal pressure
for the de-institutionalization of the prevailing norms and
practices, we highlight preferences for maintaining
established practices as a potentially important barrier to
institutional change. On these grounds, we conjecture on
the relationship between the gender diversity of boards
and other diversity dimensions. We suggest that a board
room gender quota (if implemented) is supplemented by
policies to ensure the transparency of board changes, in
order to prevent the crowding out of other diversity
dimensions.
Keywords Board of directors  Gender diversity  Gender
quota  Board diversity  Corporate elite
Introduction
The gender composition of company boards has become a
hot topic in business and politics (see for example the
Economist, March 11th, 2010). Board members around the
world are still mostly male, and the fraction of women
among them has increased only slowly. This has led to
calls for political intervention, and several countries—with
Norway as the prime example—have introduced manda-
tory gender quotas. In this paper, we adopt the institutional
theory lens to study the representation of women on the
board of directors with the aim to highlight new explana-
tions for why female board recruitment in the absence of
quota law has been so slow, even in the Nordic economies
that like to see themselves as being at the forefront of
gender equality.
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There are two partly competing, partly complementary
explanations for the slow increase in female board
recruitment. One is that that there are not enough qualified
female candidates; for example, there are not many female
CEOs or former CEOs to choose among. The other—which
we will develop in this paper—is that boards may actually
want to resist the societal pressure for greater gender
diversity as this implies a likely change in the current,
institutionalized practices of selecting directors. Boards
may value continuity and the retention of board member
competencies for efficiency reasons. However, it is also
possible that the recruitment of directors is influenced by
the incumbents’ preferences for demographically similar
individuals who are associated with known social circles
and director networks. Some would argue that these pref-
erences and associated recruitment practices have become
institutionalized through the years, putting the control of
the largest corporations into the hands of a small elite of
demographically similar individuals, i.e., the old elite,1
who share similar perceptions, views, and behavior patterns
(e.g., Useem and Karabel 1986; Westphal and Stern 2006).
Political parties, labor unions, grass roots organizations,
and some institutional investors have started to campaign
for greater gender equality in boardroom recruitment,
arguing that the underrepresentation of women is at odds
with the share of women in the labor force.2 Consequently,
companies across most of the (developed) world have been
under an increasing pressure to change their current ways
of selecting directors and increase the presence of women
in the boardroom.
The early contributions in the field of organizational
institutionalism3 envisage that societal demand, such as the
pressure for gender diversity, will ultimately shape the
structures and practices of organizations (e.g., DiMaggio
and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). However,
subsequent research has highlighted that organizations4 are
also able to respond strategically to societal pressure, and
may choose to avoid or actively resist institutional
expectations (Scott 2013). Our paper follows this line of
research, building primarily on the response framework
proposed by Oliver (1991) and its later theoretical
advancements (e.g., Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Pache
and Santos 2010; Oliver 1992). Oliver’s theoretical frame
is useful because it offers a broad basis for deriving the
context-specific and organizational-specific factors that
shape organizational responses. It also allows us to account
for resource-dependence and sociocultural antecedents of
director selection, both of which have been found relevant
for understanding boards’ structures (e.g., Withers et al.
2012). Moreover, this framework can be broadened to
account for the influence of the internal actors, i.e., owners,
current directors (also referred to as the incumbents). In
fact, when external pressure rather than the organizations
themselves is the key precipitator of an institutional
change, this change will very likely be restrained by
organizational inertia that in part derives from the incum-
bents’ preference for maintaining the status quo (Oliver
1992). Consequently, a consideration of these factors can
improve the theoretical understanding of the differences in
firms’ responses to the external pressure for institutional
change (Greenwood et al. 2011; Pache and Santos 2010).
Following Oliver (1991) and a number of empirical
verifications of this framework, we first hypothesize that
the representation of women in a firm’s boardroom will be
shaped by the firm’s visibility and exposure to societal
criticism, institutional investors’ share of ownership of the
firm, the female representation among the firm’s industry
peers, and industry-specific and country-specific charac-
teristics. We next expand this framework by combining
Oliver (1992), the later theoretical contributions introduc-
ing the intra-organizational dynamics to explain firms’
responses (e.g., Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Greenwood
et al. 2011; Pache and Santos 2010), and the scholarly
research on the minority influence in groups (e.g., Kanter
1977). On these grounds, we conjecture on the conditions
under which the incumbents will be able and motivated to
resist female appointments to the board of directors.
Specifically, we start with the assumption that, in
organizations with status quo commitment, i.e., all actors
committed to the prevailing institutionalized practices, and
in those with competitive commitments, i.e., the presence
of both the actors associated with the prevailing practices
and those that support the new ones, but prevalent support
for existing practices (Greenwood and Hinings 1996), the
incumbents will tend to resist the appointment of women to
the board. Following Greenwood et al. (2011), we identify
such firms based on the prevailing share of traditional
directors, i.e., prototypical members of the so-called ‘‘old
elite,’’ currently on the board. We next expect that—in
these firms—the incumbents’ attitude toward female
directors will be conditioned by their perception of how
1 The terms old elite or traditional directors are used in this paper to
label those directors who—in terms of age, nationality and gender—
used to constitute the majority of the directors’ elite. The terms
current or traditional practices are used to label the recruitment
norms, criteria, and channels that are still widely used and generally
associated with the traditional corporate elite.
2 Women currently represent around 40 % of the world’s labor force
(World Bank 2015, http://data.worldbank.org). However, in 2013, just
17.6 % of board seats in the largest publicly listed companies in the
EU member states were held by women (European Parliament, News
18 November 2013).
3 Organizational institutionalism refers to the stream of studies
applying the institutional lens to analyze why organizations behave as
they do, and with what consequences (Greenwood et al. 2008, p. 1).
4 The terms organization, corporation, firm, and company are used
interchangeably in this paper.
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women will de facto affect the boardroom and, in turn,
challenge the maintenance of existing recruitment practices
and other boardroom norms. We postulate that such dis-
ruption will be perceived as more likely when the status
quo is already challenged, namely when some, although a
minority share, of the directors do not resemble the tradi-
tional board elite. This proposition draws from scholarly
research on the minority influence in groups, which pos-
tulates cooperative behavior between minority groups, and
views their power to challenge the dominant coalition as
dependent on their share of the group (e.g., Kanter 1977).
These arguments therefore lead us to suggest a negative
relationship between the share of other demographic
minorities and the share of female directors on board. On
the other hand, a positive relationship is expected for
companies whose boards consist mostly of members that
are demographically dissimilar to traditional directors and,
therefore, likely to be more sympathetic to accepting new
non-traditional types of directors, such as women. We test
our hypotheses using a sample of Nordic non-financial
firms during 2001–2008. Nordic countries represent an
attractive research setting for this analysis given the
increasing pressure for gender-balanced boards observed in
these countries over the last decade. The significant share
of competent women in these countries’ labor forces, and
the high overall gender equality, should also limit—
although not resolve—the concern that the variation in
female board appointments captures differences in firms’
access to qualified female candidates rather than differ-
ences in firms’ willingness to comply with societal
expectations (which is what we are studying in this paper).
Our study contributes primarily to the literature on the
gender diversity of boards, advancing the current theoretical
understanding of the factors affecting female board repre-
sentation. Previous scientific insights (for an overview see
Terjesen et al. 2009) inform us about how female board
representation is associated with country, industry, and
selected firm-level characteristics. None of these studies,
however, adopts an institutional lens to study female board
representation, as they do not investigate the organizational
choices in periods in which explicit external pressure for
gender diversity is directed toward them, as in our study. By
adopting the institutional theory as the primary lens, and
viewing the societal demands for gender-balanced boards as
the pressure for the deinstitutionalization of the current
practices, we underline the role of the incumbents’ prefer-
ences for maintaining the status quo as an important deter-
minant of female board representation. On the same grounds,
we conjecture on the relationship between gender diversity
and other demographic characteristics of directors holding
board seats in the firms subject to societal pressure for gen-
der-balanced boards, which is also a novelty in the literature.
Theory and Hypotheses
By studying formal institutions, as well as social values,
norms, and traditions, institutional theory provides us with
an appropriate lens through which to analyze the impact of
sociocultural expectations on organizations (e.g., Meyer
and Rowan 1977; Scott 2013). This theory has in fact
become an important lens in the organizational literature
(Greenwood et al. 2008). Earlier studies that adopted the
institutional lens to study organizations were mostly con-
cerned with how the institutional context and network
embeddedness define the boundaries of organizational
structure and behavior and, in certain fields, can explain the
homogeneity in the behavior and practices adopted.
Scholars promoted the idea that organizations generally
tend to comply with the institutional prescriptions out of
habit or social obligation, because it is demanded by legal
or other rule-like frameworks, or because, by conforming
to prevailing norms and practices, they ensure legitimacy
and access to resources (Meyer and Rowan 1977;
DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
While they acknowledge that—when an external
demand conflicts with efficiency or other external pres-
sures on organizations—the conformity might be merely
symbolic, these studies promote the idea that it is the
legitimacy, cognition, and obligation rather than effi-
ciency or organizational self-interest that drives organi-
zational responses. More recently, researchers have
started paying more attention to organizational discretion,
emphasizing that organizations will not adapt equally to
institutional demands (Greenwood et al. 2011). This may
be so either because these demands do not apply equally
to all organizations, because they are not perceived or
understood as equally pressing by the organizational
actors, or because—in designing their responses—the
organizations are acting rationally, trading off the costs
and benefits of complying with societal demands (Scott
2013; Fligstein 1985). As Scott (2013) notes, an important
codification of these arguments is provided by Oliver
(1991). Combining the institutional theory with the
resource-dependence theory, which promotes the view
that organizations are able to actively cope with and
manage the external environment, Oliver (1991) proposes
a range of behaviors that organizations might adopt in
response to institutional demands, ranging from acquies-
cence to defiance. Most importantly for the purpose of the
present article, Oliver (1991) proposes a set of attributes
related to the nature and content of institutional pressures,
which determine an organization’s ability and willingness
to comply with the pressures.
These attributes can, in turn, be used to derive the
context-specific and organization-specific determinants of
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firms’ responses to a given institutional demand.5 As noted
by institutional theorists (e.g., Tolbert and Zucker 1983;
Fligstein 1985), the perceived gains and costs from com-
plying with institutional pressures likely vary with orga-
nizations’ characteristics, such as their size or visibility,
structural position in the field, nearness to the public
sphere, and the behavior of geographically similar and
structurally equivalent firms. In the present study, we fol-
low and expand this line of research to propose a number of
antecedents of firms’ compliance with gender diversity
pressures and, therefore, the share of women observed on
these companies’ boards. We outline these factors based on
their relevance with regard to the five dimensions proposed
by Oliver (1991), namely (1) the perceived legitimacy and
economic gain attained from conforming with the pressure
(cause), (2) who is exerting the pressure (constituents), (3)
how consistent this pressure is with the organizational
goals and what discretionary constraints it imposes on the
organization (content), (4) how and by what means the
pressure is exerted (control) and (5) the uncertainty and
interconnectedness of the environment in which the pres-
sure occurs (context).
The Cause of Institutional Pressure
The first proposed predictor refers to the rationale or
objectives underlying the institutional pressure at hand.
Depending on whether the demands for the institutional
change aim to address current inefficiencies in firms’
operations, social concerns, or both, organizations will
form some expectations as to the economic or social gains
to be achieved from complying with these demands. Social
gains are to be expected when the institutional pressure
accompanies broader social goals, i.e., an important social
concern such as equal opportunities for women. In such
cases, the corporations that comply with the societal
expectations should benefit from public appreciation and,
consequently, gain in terms of social fitness, legitimacy,
and reputation. In the same vein, those deviating from
societal expectations will likely fall prey to public criti-
cism, experience reputational losses and, eventually,
reduced access to resources (e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1977).
However, the gains and losses linked to compliance or non-
compliance with societal expectations probably do not
apply equally to all organizations. Scholarly research on
corporate disclosure and corporate social responsibility has
previously suggested that these effects depend on the vis-
ibility of the firm (e.g., Clemens and Douglas 2005; Julian
et al. 2008) and its exposure to the various institutions
assessing the legitimacy of organizational structures. This
proposition finds support among institutional theory
scholars (e.g., Tolbert and Zucker 1983). More visible
firms have more exposure to the eyes of the regulators, the
media, and the public or are at least likely to perceive the
expected social penalties for non-compliance as higher
than other firms. Consequently, they should have a stronger
motivation to comply with external demands (Goodstein
1994; Ingram and Simons 1995).
We therefore propose that the social benefits derived
from compliance with the societal pressure for gender
diversity and, consequently, the likelihood of observing
female directors on a firm’s board will vary with firm
characteristics related to the firm’s public visibility and
social susceptibility (e.g., the expected social penalties for
retaining an entirely male board of directors). Previous
studies testing Oliver’s framework have proxied organi-
zational visibility with measures of organizational size,
such as the number of employees (e.g., Ingram and Simons
1995; Goodstein 1994). Larger companies are more likely
to be held accountable for their actions (Goodstein 1994;
Brammer and Millington 2006; Udayasankar 2008). Given
their size and relevance to society, these firms will be
scrutinized more closely by the media, interest groups, and
consulting agencies (Ingram and Simons 1995). Large
companies, moreover, have more employees and probably
interact with a larger variety of local and foreign customers
and other constituencies that might scrutinize their actions.
Considering the increasing participation of women in the
various spheres of today’s society, these various con-
stituencies are likely to support a stronger presence of
women in the boardroom. This leads us to our first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a Larger firms are more likely to appoint
female directors and will, consequently, have a higher
share of women on their boards than other firms.
Besides firm size, other organizational characteristics
may influence the reputational damage that companies
suffer when not complying with societal expectations. We
also expect that the reputational losses from non-compli-
ance will be higher for corporations headquartered in
capital cities (capital city region). The concentration of the
various institutions assessing the legitimacy of corporate
actions (e.g., state regulatory agencies, the media, rating
agencies, professional associations, etc.) is generally higher
in capital cities, meaning that companies located there are
5 Other studies investigating organizational responses build on the
research pioneered by Oliver. Among the empirical studies, Good-
stein (1994) and Ingram and Simons (1995), for example, use this
frame to analyze the variations in employers’ involvement in work-
family issues. Julian et al. (2008) test and expand the framework by
introducing internal actors’ perceptions of the urgency and manage-
ability of the required change. Okhmatovskiy and David (2011)
analyze firm responses to newly adopted corporate governance
standards in Russia. Greenwood and Hinings (1996), Greenwood
et al. (2011), and (Pache and Santos 2010) are examples of theoretical
advancements of this framework.
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more exposed to the public eye, regardless of their size.
Most importantly, companies headquartered in capital
cities are better able to attract qualified board candidates
from abroad, due to such headquarters’ proximity to
international airports (Masulis et al. 2012). Thus, these
companies might find it harder to justify an absence of
female directors on their board by referring to difficulties in
attracting qualified female candidates. Consequently, the
likelihood of experiencing reputational losses in the case of
non-compliance could be higher for these firms.
Moreover, the supporters of gender diversity also expect
that the presence of women on a board will improve gender
diversity at lower organizational levels, as it might signal to
other female employees that the company does not dis-
criminate when hiring its top employees and thus motivate
them to compete for these positions (e.g., Matsa and Miller
2011). In the same way, the absence of women on the board
of directors might be taken as a signal of discriminatory
practices and drive away some good female employees who
aspire to leadership positions and would therefore prefer to
work for organizations that are more supportive of female
leaders. The probability of such turnover should be higher in
companies located in capital cities as the opportunities for
alternative employment will be better there. This again
implies that the costs associated with a loss of legitimacy (in
the eyes of female employees and others who value gender
diversity) will be higher for the companies headquartered in
the capital region of a country. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1b The firms headquartered in a country’s
capital city region are more likely to appoint female
directors and will, consequently, have a higher share of
women on their boards than other firms.
The challenges that countries face in promoting gender
board diversity suggest that, overall, corporations are
skeptical about the potential economic benefits of a general
increase in female representation on corporate boards. This
is further exemplified by the case of the gender quota law
in Norway, where some private joint stock companies went
as far as adopting a new corporate form to escape the
consequences (Bøhren and Staubo 2014).6 Such reactions
find some support in the extant literature, which (as yet)
offers no unified view on the benefits of gender diversity
for board efficiency and corporate performance (e.g.,
Ahern and Dittmar 2012; Bøhren and Strøm 2010). While
women bring new resources to boards of directors, improve
their accountability, and enhance board decisions by pro-
viding new angles and critical perspectives (Adams and
Ferreira 2009; Nielsen and Huse 2010), forced changes due
to quotas or affirmative action may also lead to the
recruitment of less competent directors, potentially
impairing board efficiency.
According to Oliver (1992), when the outcome of an
externally demanded institutional change is difficult to
assess—as is currently the case for female board represen-
tation—the organizational attitude toward the new practice
will ultimately be shaped by the internal actors’ expectations
or beliefs about the economic consequences or efficiency of
such a change. In the case of gender diversity, we would
therefore expect a firm’s willingness to comply to depend on
what those in charge of selecting directors—i.e., the com-
pany’s owners and the current boardmembers as the owners’
representatives7—perceive or expect the economic effects of
an increased female presence in the boardroom to be. In this
regard, we propose that these expectations will, on average,
be more positive (or less negative) in cases where a larger
share of the owners and directors are (or represent) institu-
tional investors.
We derive this proposition from the academic research
on the role of institutional investors in endorsing good
corporate governance practices (e.g., Dobin and Jung 2011;
Farrell and Hersch 2005). Institutional investors have, over
the last few years, been active in promoting corporate
governance reforms that have led to stricter board moni-
toring and stronger director independence, thus challenging
the embedded practices of the traditional directors’ elite
(Westphal and Khanna 2003). Enhancing gender diversity
on company boards may be considered part or in line with
such reforms. In fact, women are found to have higher
board meeting attendance rates and to improve board
oversight (Adams and Ferreira 2009). They are less
embedded in the traditional directors’ networks and
therefore possibly less susceptible to the influence of
managers or other members of the elite (Fanto et al. 2011).
Although there is no robust evidence that they would be
6 In June 2003, after a period of intense public debate, the Norwegian
government issued a voluntary recommendation, according to which a
minimum 40 percent representation of each gender on the boards of
limited liability companies was supposed to be ensured. However,
many firms did not comply voluntarily with the assigned two-year
period. Consequently, the quota law became effective in January
2006, giving the companies only 2 years to meet the new require-
ments. The fact that the Norwegian government was forced to resort
to a quota law to increase female representation further indicates that
corporations were skeptical about the effects of the recommended
changes.
7 We allow for both shareholders’ and the current board members’
preferences to play a role in the selection of female directors. In the
Nordic countries, the shareholders not only formally appoint directors
but also play a bigger role in the selection process and—when holding
a large ownership share—they themselves hold a board seat. Past
studies, however, show that the nomination committee often proposes
prospective candidates based on recommendations by current board
members or by executive search firms that tend to follow the
directors’ preferences (Johnson et al. 2011; Stafsudd 2006). Anecdo-
tal evidence and case-based evidence from Nordic firms similarly
suggest that the decision to search for a female candidate is often
initiated by the board.
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better board members, these insights imply that women
might be better able to provide independent and objective
opinions on how a company is being monitored. Thus, the
demanded changes in gender diversity appear to be con-
sistent with governance practices that institutional inves-
tors have promoted in recent years and that they probably
perceive as valuable. Consequently, these investors will
likely be more supportive of these demands that, for
example, private individual owners. Moreover, some
institutional owners might also be more supportive of
gender diversity pressures due to a more political orienta-
tion and ties to government organizations or labor unions
(Woidtke 2002). Thus, we propose,
Hypothesis 2 The higher the share of institutional
investors’ ownership, the higher will be the share of
women on the board of directors.
The Constituencies of Institutional Pressures
Shareholder perceptions of female directorships may also
depend on the role women play as organizational con-
stituencies, i.e., consumers, employees, and others. For
example, female directors might be better able to understand
female customers and could, consequently, be more benefi-
cial to a company with a large share of women among its
customers. At the same time, we expect that a firm’s
dependence on female constituencies will make it more
susceptible to the pressure promoting gender equality.
Consequently, in line with the propositions of the resource-
dependence theory, a company’s dependence on the con-
stituencies behind this societal pressure should be an
important driver of the organizational willingness to comply
with the pressure (Oliver 1991). Ingram and Simons (1995)
and Goodstein (1994) apply this proposition in studying
organizational responsiveness to work–family issues.
Specifically, they show that organizations’ concerns and
efforts related to such issues increase with their dependence
on female constituencies, namely the percentages of female
employees and managers. Using the lens of the resource-
dependence theory, Hillman et al. (2007) similarly predict
that the probability of finding a female director will be higher
within industries in which women are important customers
or employees. According to them, female directors in such
industries are more beneficial as they can facilitate the firm’s
access to female employees and consumers. They find
empirical support for this claim using a sample of the largest
publicly listed US corporations during 1990–2003. We
consequently propose the following:
Hypothesis 3 The higher a firm’s dependence on female
constituencies, the higher will be the share of women on its
board of directors.
The Content: Deinstitutionalization of Old Practices
and the Incumbents’ Resistance to Change
Oliver (1991) argues that an organization’s willingness to
comply with a new societal norm or practice will depend
on its content, namely on how consistent it is with the
current organizational goals and processes, and how much
the new norm restrains the discretion of the decision
makers in the organization.8 Along these lines, we expect
that the incumbents will be reluctant to introduce a new
practice when they perceive it as being in conflict with the
current organizational goals and interests (e.g., Oliver
1991, 1992). As shown in the literature, organizations
generally do contain such structural inertia. Internal actors,
in particular, may be reluctant to change when the nature of
the change is poorly understood, is perceived as costly,
increases uncertainty, or threatens the identity of the
dominant coalition (e.g., Astley and Van den Ven 1983;
Child 1972; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Oliver 1992;
Westphal and Khanna 2003). This is often the case when
societal pressure requires the organizational actors to
deinstitutionalize a practice that is currently or was earlier
considered appropriate, such as when the demand for a
change does not originate from inside the organization
(Oliver 1992). In such circumstances, the actual change
will be likely conditioned by the key actors’ support of the
status quo, as well as by the position or power that the
groups, respectively, opposing and promoting the new
practices in the organization (e.g., Greenwood and Hinings
1996; Greenwood et al. 2011; Pache and Santos 2010).
Contentwise, the external pressure for greater gender
diversity in Nordic firms does challenge the institutional-
ized practices of director selection. The calls for more
gender-diversified boards ultimately require that organiza-
tions change their current recruitment practices, i.e., the
criteria and channels of recruitment, and fill the board-
rooms with individuals who are therefore in many ways
different from the traditional members. Given these dif-
ferences, the newcomers (i.e., females) will—at least ini-
tially—be less strongly associated with the currently
required competence profile, directors’ networks, profes-
sional associations, and other social structures9 (e.g., Pelled
et al. 1999; Withers et al. 2012), and have different CVs,
8 Prior studies (e.g., Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988) support the
relevance of the fit between the existing norms and practices, showing
how an organization’s established practice dissolves or changes once
its objectives change and become inconsistent with the organizational
objectives and processes.
9 Women reportedly encounter barriers to building professional
relationships with the male members of the corporate elite, and to
moving up the organizational hierarchy (e.g., Farrell and Hersch
2005; Waldstrøm and Madsen 2007).
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orientations, and dispositions than the traditional members
(e.g., Ahern and Dittmar 2012).
Given these differences and the insights from institutional
theory, we expect that in the companies whose dominant
actors still strongly support the current (institutionalized)
practices of directors’ selection, for example, demanding
CEO or CFO experience as an important qualification for new
board members, we should observe a general resistance
toward the new practices promoting the appointment of can-
didates, i.e., women, less likely to fulfill these criteria. Based
on this, we first propose that the organizations where the
majority share of the board members is still represented by
those prototypical of the old elite should be more resistant to
appoint new female directors in comparison to other firms.We
use the current board structure to capture the position and
influence of the traditional elite in the firm based on Green-
wood et al. (2011), who propose that the power and prefer-
ences of the different stakeholders or groups in the
organization will ultimately reflect in the governance struc-
ture, such as their representation on the board of directors.
We, however, argue that—even in these firms with the
traditional type of board—the resistance toward female
directors will not be equally strong. If the concern for
maintaining the status quo is the one driving the actors’
resistance toward female directors, the strength of this
resistance should vary with the incidence of other demo-
graphic minorities on the board. Specifically, we propose
that the board’s resistance will be stronger, and that women
will be less likely to hold seats on company boards, when
some (minor) share of board seats is already held by
members who do not correspond to the prototype of a
traditional director, i.e., diverse male directors. Differently
put, the marginal effect of a female director on the board’s
current practices is expected to be perceived as stronger
(and more challenging to the current status quo) when
diverse members, such as younger male or foreign male
directors, are already present on the board.
We derive this proposition from the critical mass theo-
ries and the extant evidence on minority influence in
groups (such as boards of directors). As proposed by
Kanter (1977), when a dominant share of members of a
group are homogeneous with respect to salient demo-
graphic characteristics, i.e., skewed groups, it will be dif-
ficult for other types to influence the group. However, this
can change as these various diverse members turn from
‘‘tokens’’ into a minority. For the case of gender diversity
specifically, we could therefore expect that, when other
non-traditional members or diverse males10 are present on
a board, a woman may be able to form a subgroup with
such members, thereby reducing the pressure on these
members to go along with the dominants. An increase in
the probability of the formation of such groups of diverse
members will increase the perception of the influence that
(new) women could have on the board (e.g., Lau and
Murnighan 1998). As noted by Kanter (1977, p. 382),
‘‘Minority members are potential allies for each other, can
form coalitions, and can affect the culture of the group.
They begin to become individuals differentiated from each
other as well as a type differentiated from the majority.’’ In
support of this, Westphal and Milton (2000) find that the
minority influence is enhanced when alternative bases of
in-group categorization, i.e., in terms of age, nationality,
education, etc., and social similarity are created between
minority and majority directors.
The arguments presented above suggest that—in the
companieswith the dominant share of traditional directors—a
higher (minority) share of diverse members should imply a
lower presence of women on board. This relationship might
however become positive in the cases where the diverse male
members actually dominate the board.As argued above, some
corporations might have—at some point in the past—already
deviated from the standard channels of director selection and
began appointing diverse board members, whether as tokens
or for efficiency reasons, e.g., due to changes in their business
environment (entering global markets) or changes in their
ownership structure (e.g., an increase in foreign ownership).
As is also noted byOliver (1992), ‘‘a dissipation or rejection of
a practice can occur from within an organization in cases
where the perceived worth of an institutional practice is re-
evaluated or reconsidered and becomes non-efficient, such as
when important environmental constituents reorient their
demands on the organization so that the organization is
rewarded less for the sustained implementation of institu-
tionally acceptable structures…’’.
Particularly in the case of a geographical expansion of a
firm’s activities, traditional practices are likely to be
challenged and replaced by norms and practices that are
more general and defocalized (Oliver 1992). In this fash-
ion, studies show how the globalization of firms’ activities
and ownership has led some firms to look for candidates
outside their traditional networks and to recruit foreign
individuals that can provide knowledge and expertise on
foreign markets (Oxelheim et al. 2013). Coming from
abroad, these members are likely different from the tradi-
tional board elite and will probably identify less strongly
with the local directors’ practices. They should, conse-
quently, be also less committed to defend the existing
practices (e.g., Pache and Santos 2010). Hence, we would
expect the concern for maintaining traditional practices to
no longer be relevant in corporations whose boards already
predominantly consist of non-traditional directors. To the
10 The members with diverse backgrounds and experiences have
different interpretive frameworks (e.g., Oliver 1992; Pelled et al.
1999), and will therefore be more likely to join women in questioning
taken-for-granted practices.
Resistance to Change in the Corporate Elite: Female Directors’ Appointments onto Nordic Boards
123
contrary, being themselves still a minority in the corporate
elite, these members might actively promote the entry of
new diverse members onto the board of directors. They
might also have—through their own networks—better
access to potential female candidates, which should facil-
itate the appointment of female directors. Therefore, we
propose,
Hypothesis 4 There is a curvilinear relationship between
the share of diverse male members on a firm’s board
(younger and foreign male directors) and the share of
women, so that the impact of diverse male members on the
share of women on a board will change from negative to
positive once diverse male directors dominate the board.
The Institutional Pressure and Control
As mentioned in the introduction, the low level of female
representation at the top of business organizations around
the world has become a hot topic in public debates over the
last few years. The approaches taken by governments to
enforce, or promote, greater gender diversity vary across
countries and time. Furthermore, in cases where govern-
ments have implemented forced gender representation, the
associated penalties for non-compliance have varied
greatly. The first country to opt for coercive measures was
Norway when, in January 2006, its government adopted a
law requiring a minimum 40 % representation of each
gender on the boards of public limited liability companies.
While a few other European countries, including France,
Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands, have decided to
follow Norway’s example, other countries have adopted a
softer approach. In Sweden in 2002, for example, Mar-
gareta Winberg—the deputy prime minister from the
Social Democratic Party—threatened companies with
binding regulations if they failed to increase the female
representation on their boards to 25 % within 5 years. Two
years later (2004), it became mandatory to disclose the
gender distribution of boards, but no legal quota was
imposed. After years of discussion on the issues sur-
rounding quotas, Denmark recently settled on a softer
option, introducing a law that only requires the largest
companies to adopt internal targets and to actively promote
gender diversity in their boards. In Finland, the gender-
equality discussion resulted in a quota law that only applies
to companies operating in the public sector.
The types of processes through which institutional
control is exerted, the types of sources of pressure, and the
types of bodies monitoring the compliance will define the
strength of the institutional pressure on organizations and
in turn the odds of organizational adaptation (Zucker 1987;
Oliver 1991). The pressure to comply will likely be
stronger when societal demand is supported by law and
promoted by governmental organizations than when the
pressure stems from public debates and appeals by interest
groups, in which case the sanctions for non-compliance
remain limited to eventual reputational losses. When the
societal demand is supported by law or the threat of gov-
ernment intervention, the corporations are made explicitly
aware of the public interest, and of the measures they must
take in order to achieve compliance. Consequently, even-
tual deviations are also more easily identified. Finally, as
evidenced in the case of Norway, where non-compliance
with the quota law was punishable by the dissolution of the
firm in question, the consequences of non-conformity are
likely to be more severe when they are imposed through
government or legal mandate. Based on this, we propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5a The higher the degree of legal coercion
behind the institutional pressure for female directorships,
the higher will be the share of women on the firms’ boards
of directors.
Legal coercion is not the only mechanism through which
institutional pressure and expectations may be placed on
organizations. Referring to empirical evidence (Tolbert and
Zucker 1983; Fligstein 1985), Oliver (1991) suggests that
organizational compliance with institutional pressure to
adopt a new practice will be higher when the practice has
already spread through an organizational field, i.e., among
a company’s peers. Differently put, when a substantial
share of other corporations in the organizational field have
already adopted the demanded change in a practice or
behavior, it will be harder for an individual organization to
justify a deviation from this new norm. For example, with
regard to gender diversity in the boardroom, companies
often attempt to excuse themselves by claiming that it is
very hard to find qualified female candidates.11 However,
such an excuse will be less credible once the public can
observe that many other comparable organizations have
successfully overcome this barrier and complied with
societal expectations. Besides limiting their ability to jus-
tify non-conformity, a broader diffusion of the new norms,
values, or practices in the field will also increase the
validity and credibility of these norms or practices, thereby
reducing any organizational skepticism toward their effects
and increasing organizational willingness to comply (Oli-
ver 1991). Consequently, we propose,
Hypothesis 5b The share of women on a firm’s board
will be higher, the higher is the share of the firm’s peers
that already have female directors on their boards.
11 http://www.svd.se/naringsliv/nyheter/sverige/spendrups-uttalande-
om-kvinnor-uppror_8977028.svd.
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The Context of Institutional Pressure
As the final factor, Oliver (1991) considers organizational
context. She argues that organizations are more likely to
comply with institutional pressure when they operate under a
high level of environmental uncertainty, and when the level
of their interconnectedness through various professional
associations and organizations is high. We do not make
explicit hypotheses on these factors as we generally expect
that the Nordic public corporations face similar levels of
uncertainty and—considering the small countries’ sizes—
are associated with the same professional associations and
organizations (within a given country or industry). Yet, we
allow for differences in the impact of these factors in our
models by including country, time, and industry dummies.
Sample and Methods
Sample
Our study addresses non-financial publicly traded firms
headquartered in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway
during the period 2001–2008. For these companies, we
collected the name and surname, gender, year of birth, time
of first appointment to the board, and nationality of the
CEO and of the directors. The main source of director
information was the annual reports. In order to correctly
identify the directors’ nationalities, the information was
collected by a national of the country in which the firm was
headquartered. When the identification of the nationality
was not straightforward, a number of alternative data
sources (such as BoardEx, Business Week, the internet, and
lists of important individuals) were used. We performed a
final check by comparing the information for the same
board member across different years, and rechecking all
information using at least one alternative source. Not all
firms in the sample had been listed on the stock exchange
since 2001, and some had delisted before 2008; firms were
included in the study only for the years in which they were
listed. About 15 % of the companies were excluded from
the sample because we could not retrieve information on
their board structures. However, we found that they did not
differ systematically from the companies we included in
the analysis. For consistency with previous research (e.g.,
Farrell and Hersch 2005), we also excluded financial firms
(SIC 6000–7000). The board information was then merged
with financial and ownership data. Financial data were
collected from the Worldscope/Thomson Financial Data-
base, and ownership data from the Thomson Ownership
Database. Merging the data from these various sources
resulted in a final sample of 3124 firm-year observations
(502 firms) across the four Nordic countries.
Variables
Dependent Variables
The focus of our study is firms’ compliance with the
societal pressure for more women on boards. Oliver (1991)
distinguishes between various typologies of compliance,
which also capture the extent to which organizations sub-
mit to external pressure. In this paper, we focus on the
extent of organizational compliance (as in Ingram and
Simons 1995) rather than on the exact typology of the
organizational response. Following Ingram and Simons
(1995), we assume that a higher level of organizational
compliance with external pressure implies a higher amount
of what is demanded, namely a higher share of women on
the board of directors. We consequently define our main
dependent variable as the percentage of women on the
board of directors (Female directors %). In this regard, we
need to consider that in the Nordic countries, some of the
board members may be employee representatives. Given
that they are elected by the employees and from among the
company’s workforce, the recruitment of these members to
the board might be less influenced by the norms and values
of the traditional elite, and less targeted by the societal
pressure.12 Consequently, we define as an alternative
dependent variable the percentage of shareholder-elected
women out of all shareholder-elected directors on the board
(Shareholder female %). In selected specifications, where
we control for the role of a female chairman or female
CEO, these percentages only include women who are
neither the chairman nor the CEO of the company (Non-
leading shareholder female %).
Explanatory Variables
To capture firm visibility (Hypothesis 1a), we first define a
size variable as the logarithm of the total number of
employees (Firm size). Other studies using the Oliver
(1991) framework refer to firms’ size as an appropriate
proxy for their exposure to public criticism (e.g., Goodstein
12 The Norwegian quota, for example, states the criteria separately
for the shareholder and employee-elected directors. For shareholder-
elected directors, it requires the following: on boards with two or
three members, both genders are to be represented; on boards with
four or five members, each gender is to be represented by at least two
members; on boards with six to eight members, each gender is to be
represented by at least three members; on boards with nine members,
each gender is to be represented by at least four members; on boards
with more than nine members, at least a 40 % representation of each
gender is required. Different rules apply to employee-elected
directors. In cases where two or more employee representatives are
to be elected, both genders must be represented. This rule, however,
does not apply in companies where a gender represents less than 20 %
of the total number of employees at the time of the election.
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1994; Ingram and Simons 1995). With regard to our
Hypothesis 1b, we include a dummy variable to which we
assign the value 1 when a firm is headquartered in the
capital city region of a country and 0 otherwise (Capital).
We further hypothesized that institutional investors are
more likely than other owners to perceive female repre-
sentation as beneficial (Hypothesis 2). To capture this
effect, we define the variable Institutional investors % as
the ratio between the total ownership share held by insti-
tutional investors (when present among the five largest
owners) and the total ownership share held by the five
largest owners, expressed as a percentage. We consider
only the five largest owners due to data restrictions (in-
formation on owners’ shares and identities was only
available for the five largest owners). This appears to be a
minor limitation, since there are generally no more than
five owners with any relevant influence, i.e., owning at
least 5 % of the shares, in the companies constituting our
Nordic sample.
To test whether the perceived benefits of appointing
women and the pressure to do so are stronger in certain
industries that are more dependent on female directors
(Hypothesis 3), we include Fama-French industry dummies
in pooled regressions, i.e., models without firm fixed
effects. We chose the 17-industry classification based on
the distribution of our companies across the various
industries. Following Ingram and Simons’ (1995) study,
which measures organizational dependence on women by
the share of female leaders, we include two indicator
variables in selected specifications, a dummy for compa-
nies with female leadership of the board of directors (Fe-
male chairman) and a dummy for those with female
leadership of the management board (Female CEO).
For the purpose of testing our Hypothesis 4, we include
a set of explanatory variables, capturing the share of non-
traditional or diverse board members among the male
members of the board, Diverse male 1 %. We define the
percentage of these male directors, namely those who are
demographically different from traditional directors, based
on nationality and age. Besides gender, nationality and age
are the two most readily detectable demographic charac-
teristics (Jackson et al. 1995), and were also the ones most
commonly used to characterize the traditional corporate
elite.13 In the companies with employee board representa-
tion, older male nationals that are elected by the employees
are also counted as diverse directors, in addition to for-
eigners and young male directors.
We consider all younger male directors and all foreign
directors to be demographically diverse, and calculate the
percentage of these diverse members in the total number of
male members on the board of directors. We consider
young directors to be those younger than 49 years old. This
age is about 5 years below the average age of the male
directors in the starting year of the analysis (53.2 years in
2001); this definition is in line with other studies that have
used a 5-year span to group people of the same age (e.g.,
Feld 1982). The threshold is also equal to the average age
of the female directors in the starting year of our study.
Foreigners comprise all non-nationals, including those
from other Nordic countries. Speaking a different language
and being from geographically distant places, foreign
directors might be—we argue—less embedded in the local
structures, less connected to the inner circles of the direc-
tors’ networks, and, thus, perceived as ‘different’ from the
local individuals. Other studies on Nordic boards in fact
show that foreign directors represent a relatively small
share of board members, and that their presence has mostly
been driven by the increasing foreign ownership in the
Nordics over the last decade (Oxelheim et al. 2013). Also,
it has been shown that European business networks remain
within national borders, even in the smaller European
countries (Heemskerk 2011). Local individuals presumably
resist foreign appointments due to a fear of losing domi-
nance and power in the local corporate arena (Carroll and
Fennema 2002; Heemskerk 2011; Rhodes and Van Apel-
doorn 1998).
Country and time dummies are included to account for
the salience of public pressure for gender-balanced boards
(Hypothesis 5a). To account for peer pressure (Hypothesis
5b), we construct a variable that measures the percentage
of other firms (in the industry, country, and year) that have
at least one shareholder-elected female board member
(Fem industry %). Specifically, we take all the other
companies in a firm’s industry in a given year and country
and count the number of women on their boards. We then
calculate the share of those companies that have at least
one shareholder-elected woman on their boards (separately
for each industry, year, and country). The construction of
these variables follows previous studies, for example,
Goodstein (1994).
Control Variables
Corporate governance research has previously shown that
the selection of a company’s directors is often influenced
by the preferences of its CEO (e.g., Westphal and Zajac
1995). Due to concentrated ownership and, consequently, a
strong role of owners on the board of directors and in the
selection of directors, such an influence is probably weaker
in the Nordics in comparison, for example, to the United
13 This categorization is not exhaustive in the sense that it does not
consider all the attributes that are distinctive of the corporate elite. For
example, we do not consider directors’ experience and education.
However, the directors’ experience, in particular, may be partly
captured by other variables since it is likely to be associated with age
(e.g., Hillman et al. 2002) and residence abroad.
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States. Moreover, about 60 % of the listed companies in
our Nordic sample adhere to a two-tier board system,
whereby no members of the management board sit on the
board of directors (or supervisory board). In the remaining
40 %, only one member of the management board, nor-
mally the CEO, is a member of the supervisory board.
Since, in the latter case, the CEO as a member of the board
has more opportunities to influence director selection, we
include a dummy variable to which we assign the value 1 if
the CEO is also a member of the board, and 0 otherwise
(CEO on board). We further control for the total number of
shareholder-elected board members in all our regressions
(Boardsize). Larger boards are found in more complex and
larger companies (Coles et al. 2008), which are likely to
have more connections to outside constituencies and to be
more susceptible to public pressure. Moreover, it might be
easier to make room for a female director in a larger board.
Generally, only part of a board can be changed in any one
period without substantial cost to the firm, as the existing
directors will carry important strategic and operational
knowledge, accumulated through their years as board
members (Forbes and Milliken 1999). This may be par-
ticularly so in smaller boards, where a few individuals are
providing a variety of expertise and other resources to the
firm. Moreover, the probability that one of the members
will leave the board or retire, opening a space for a woman,
should also be higher in larger boards.
We also include the firm’s age, measured by the natural
logarithm of the number of years since a firm’s establish-
ment (plus 1). Besides a firm’s size, its age has also been
found to be correlated with higher perceived status of the
firm. The high status intensifies a firm’s exposure to
institutional demands as high-status firms are probably
more visible and therefore attract a lot of media attention
(Greenwood et al. 2011). Therefore, older firms should feel
more pressured to comply with societal pressure as they
have more to lose in terms of status or reputation. On the
other hand, a firm’s age is also positively correlated with
the firm’s centrality in an organizational field, which means
that older firms might be more embedded in the current
institutional relations and practices (Greenwood et al.
2011; Leblebici et al. 1991). Moreover, older companies
have more valuable and longer-term relations with differ-
ent constituencies and more accumulated internal resources
than younger firms (Filatotchev et al. 2006). Being less
dependent on external resources and having built their
reputation on repeated interactions rather than organiza-
tional characteristics, conforming to external pressure
might be less of a necessity for these companies in terms of
their ability to access key resources.
To account for the influence of, and eventually similar
or conflicting pressure imposed by, other key constituen-
cies, such as employees and banks, we control for the
percentage of employee-elected members on the board
(Employee-elected %) and for firm debt measured as a
firm’s short- and long-term debt as a percentage of total
assets (Debt %). We also control for firm performance,
measured by the ratio between the market and book values
of a firm’s equity and liabilities (Tobin’s Q). Firms with
higher value may be better able to attract the best female
candidates, have access to a larger pool, and be better able
to focus on diversity issues (Farrell and Hersch 2005).
Besides the stated firm-specific controls, all our regressions
include time effects and (except for the specifications with
firm fixed effects) country and industry effects (Table 1).
Method
We start with a simple model, in which we estimate a
regression with the percentage of female directors as the
dependent variable and the above-described explanatory
and control variables, using the pooled OLS estimator with
the standard errors clustered by firm. We present the results
in Table 2, model 1. To account for unobserved firm-
specific effects, we estimate a linear fixed effects model
(with standard errors clustered by firm) in model 2. For the
purpose of testing Hypothesis 4, in models 3a and 3b, we
include the square of diverse male directors (Diverse male
1 %)2. In model 3a, we include firm fixed effects; to mit-
igate the reverse causality issues, in model 3b, we re-esti-
mate model 3a with all the explanatory variables lagged by
1 year (i.e., measured at t-1). As an alternative to
including the squared term, in models 4a and 4b, we esti-
mate the regressions separately for those companies with a
majority of traditional board directors (model 4a) and those
where the traditional members of the elite are already in the
minority, which we argue is likely due to a previous dis-
sipation of the traditional practices and norms (model 4b).
The pressure for gender diversity on boards primarily
targets the shareholder-elected board members, as in most
of today’s corporations, no other constituencies elect rep-
resentatives onto the board. However, in some companies
in our Nordic sample, the employees also have the right to
elect a minor share of directors, from among the employ-
ees. To isolate the effects of employee-elected members
and for the sake of comparison with countries without
employee representation on boards14 (such as Finland), we
next replicate our estimations presented in Table 2 using as
14 Given the high share of women among the labor force currently,
the supply of female candidates and the benefits of their represen-
tation are likely than in the case of shareholder-elected members. In
fact, from the beginning of our sample period, the share of women
among the employee-elected directors has been relatively high
(around 20 %) and it has not changed substantially over the
observation period.
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the dependent variable the share of shareholder-elected
female directors among all shareholder-elected directors on
the board (Shareholder female %). We adjust the main
explanatory variables accordingly to the percentage of
young or foreign shareholder-elected male directors out of
all shareholder-elected male directors (SH Diverse male
1 %). We present the results in Table 3.
We first estimate a simple OLS regression with standard
errors clustered by firm and the square of our measure of
diverse directors in model 5a. We add firm fixed effects in
model 5b. Both models include the square of shareholder-
elected diverse male directors (SH Diverse male 1 %)2. In
model 6a and 6b, we estimate the models separately for
those companies with a majority of traditional board
members (model 6a) and those in which the latter are
already in a minority among the shareholder-elected
directors (model 6b). The dependent variable in model 7a
is the share of shareholder-elected women on the board
who are neither the chairman nor the CEO (Non-leading
shareholder female %). Model 7b replicates the model 7a
using firm fixed effects estimator.
To alleviate multicollinearity problems, we calculated
the variance inflation factors for all the main variables in
our model. These factors were all well below the critical
level of 10, suggesting there is no reason for collinearity
concerns. To mitigate the influence of extreme values, the
uppermost and lowermost percentiles for each financial
variable were set equal to the values at the first and 99th
percentiles in each year, respectively. Most of our models
include firm fixed effects to account for unobserved firm-
specific heterogeneity, which requires some within-firm
variation of our dependent and main explanatory variables.
Therefore, some additional information might be of interest
in this regard. We observe no change in the percentage of
women on the board in slightly less than 28 % of all firms
in the final sample, while in the remaining firms, the per-
centage of women on the board either decreased or
increased at least once during the period of analysis. In
terms of firm-year observations, no change in the share of
women on the board is observed in about 64 % of such
observations, an increase is observed in 24 %, and a
decrease in 12 %. In 2001, only 40 % of the firms in our
sample had at least one female director. In the year 2008,
this percentage increased to nearly 75 %.
The share of diverse male board members did not
change in about 16 % of all firms (47 % of firm-year
observations). In the year 2001, about 11 % of the com-
panies had a completely homogeneous composition of
male directors (i.e., all shareholder-elected older home-
country males); in 2008, the share of such companies
increased to 13 % (Diverse male 1 %). These percentages
are higher when we look at just the shareholder-elected
members of the board (SH Diverse male 1 %). In 2001,
about 16 % of the companies had all of their shareholder
members corresponding to the traditional director proto-
type; diverse males held less than half of the shareholder-
elected seats held by men in about 68 % of all companies
in our 2001 sample. In the year 2008, nearly 22 % of
companies had no diverse directors among the shareholder-
elected members of the board; the share of such directors
was less than half of the board in just under 70 % of all
firms.
Empirical Results
The descriptive statistics and partial correlation coefficients
are shown in Table 1. The numbers refer to the sample of
502 non-financial firms (3124 firm-year observations,
unbalanced sample) used in the regression analysis. The
correlation coefficients indicate a positive and significant
correlation between the percentage of female directors and
the following: the total number of board members, the
capital city dummy, and the share of other companies in the
same industry that have at least one shareholder-elected
female on their board. The percentage of female directors
is also positively correlated with firm size, firm value, and
the share of employee-elected board members, while a
negative correlation is observed between it and firm age,
firm debt, and the dummy for companies whose CEO is
also a member of the board.
We report the main results of our empirical analysis in
Tables 2 and 3. Here, we discuss the results across the
various specifications of regression models and dependent
variables. First, as predicted in Hypothesis 1, we observe a
higher percentage of women on the boards of larger com-
panies and companies headquartered in capital cities. The
effects of size and the capital dummy are positive and
significant in the OLS specifications for both the overall
share of women on the board (e.g., model 1, Table 2) and
the share of shareholder-elected female directors (see
variables Capital and Firm size in model 5a Table 3). The
coefficients for firm size, however, become insignificant
when adding firm fixed effects or when lagging the size
variable by 1 year (see e.g., model 3a, 3b in Table 2).15
Here, we must note that firm size shows strong correlation
with the board size (Board size); the coefficient for the
latter variable remains positive and significant across var-
ious specifications. Since a larger board of directors is also
associated with a higher complexity of firm operations
(Coles et al. 2008) and, consequently, a higher exposure of
a firm to a variety of different constituencies, the positive
15 The coefficient for the variable Capital cannot be estimated in the
specifications with firm fixed effects since the value of this variable
does not vary in time.
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and significant effect of board size could be viewed as
additional support for the conclusion that stronger visibility
and social exposure leads to stronger organizational will-
ingness to comply with external pressure. All in all, these
results provide support for Hypothesis 1b and only partial
support to Hypothesis 1a.
As expressed by Hypothesis 2, we expected a positive
effect of institutional investors’ ownership on the share of
women on a board. The sign of the coefficient for this
variable, however, varies depending on the specification of
our regression model, which is to be expected considering
that institutional investors’ ownership is likely endogenous,
i.e., correlates with unobserved firm-specific characteris-
tics. In our fixed effects specification, where we account for
unobserved heterogeneity, institutional investors’ owner-
ship is found to have no significant effect on the incidence
of female directors. One reason for the insignificant coef-
ficient for institutional investors’ ownership may be that
some other ownership categories, which are included in our
reference group, such as family ownership or government
ownership, are actually associated with quite high levels of
gender diversity of the board in the first place. All in all,
our results provide no support for our Hypothesis 2.
In terms of industry effects (Hypothesis 3), a signifi-
cantly lower number of female directors are observed in the
metal industry and—in some specifications—in construc-
tion and in mining,16 while other industry dummies are
mostly insignificant. Even when we exclude the other
control and explanatory variables (which may correlate
with industry effects), most of our industry dummies
remain insignificant. Alternatively, we capture the rele-
vance of female constituencies by the presence of a female
chairman and the presence of a female CEO. For reasons of
space, we only show the results for the dependent variable
defined as the share of women among the shareholder-
elected directors (Non-leading shareholder female %) in
models 7a and 7b in Table 3. The coefficients for the
female chairman and female CEO are insignificant. The
insignificant values for these regression coefficients might
be partly due to the small number of changes in the gender
of the CEO or chairman in our sample. However, even in
model 7a, where we do not include firm fixed effects, the
coefficients for both variables remain insignificant (and
positive for the female CEO, while negative for the female
chairman). The coefficients are insignificant also when
using the share of women among all board members (Fe-
male Directors %) as the dependent variable (estimates not
reported). All in all, these results provide no support for
Hypothesis 3.
In relation to our Hypothesis 4, we find that a higher
share of diverse male directors on a board (Diverse male
1 %) implies a lower level of female directors on a board
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and partial correlation coefficients
Mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Female
directors %
13.69 1
2 Shareholder
female %
11.42 0.91 1
3 Diverse male % 41.32 0.03 0.03 1
4 SH diverse male
2 %
24.49 -0.01 0.01 0.77 1
5 Firm age (years) 27 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.15 1
6 Capital 0.57 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 -0.03 1
7 Fem industry % 50.40 0.46 0.50 -0.05 -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 1
8 CEO on board 0.39 -0.09 -0.06 -0.11 -0.11 0.09 0.00 0.08 1
9 Board size 6 0.11 0.14 -0.05 -0.03 0.24 0.05 0.16 0.28 1
10 Employee-
elected %
12.27 0.14 -0.08 0.28 -0.07 0.23 -0.03 -0.12 -0.07 -0.04 1
11 Firm size (in
logarithms)
6.69 0.10 0.04 -0.07 -0.13 0.38 0.13 -0.03 0.08 0.50 -0.31 1
12 Debt % 16.94 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.23 1
13 Tobin’s Q 1.80 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.03 -0.12 0.04 0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.22 -0.23 1
14 Institutional
investors %
48.58 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.10 0.06 -0.01 0.08 0.21 0.10 0.21 -0.10 0.04
The mean values and correlation coefficients refer to the 3124 observations (502 firms) used in model 1. Significant correlation coefficients are
reported in italics
16 The estimates for the industry dummies are not reported for
reasons of space.
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(see for example model 1, Table 2). To allow for the fact
that the sign of this coefficient changes at some threshold,
we model a curvilinear relationship between the share of
diverse male directors and the presence of women on the
board. In model 3a and 3b of Table 2 and models 5a, 5b,
and 7a, 7b of Table 3, we therefore add the square of the
percentage of diverse male board members (Diverse male
1 %)2. The coefficient of the basic variable (Diverse male
1 %) is negative and statistically significant, while that of
the squared term is positive and statistically significant in
all models. These relations hold when we add firm fixed
effects (e.g., model 3a, Table 2) and also when we lag the
explanatory variables (including the one for diverse male
board members) for 1 year (e.g., model 3b, Table 2).
Alternatively, we divide our sample into two subsamples
based on the share of board seats held by diverse male
directors. We present the results of this analysis in Table 2,
models 4a and 4b and in Table 3, models 6a and 6b. For the
subsample of companies in which the traditional directors
still hold the majority of the male-held board seats, the
relationship between the diverse male members and the
share of women on board remains negative and statistically
significant. However, the sign of the coefficient for the
effect of diverse male board members on the share of
female directors (or shareholder-elected female directors)
becomes positive in cases where the traditional board
members hold less than the majority of board seats (see the
model 4b in Table 2 and model 6b in Table 3).
Table 2 Female directors on Nordic Boards
Female directors %
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3a) Model (3b) Model (4a) Model (4b)
Firm size 0.664** (2.087) 0.718 (1.319) 0.800 (1.509) 0.604 (0.962) 0.745 (1.182) 1.321 (1.096)
Capital 1.835** (1.994) – – – – –
Institutional
investors %
-0.024**
(-2.167)
0.007 (0.450) 0.007 (0.454) 0.007 (0.546) -0.006 (-0.306) 0.053** (2.352)
Diverse male 1 % -0.045**
(-2.377)
-0.042**
(-1.976)
-0.233***
(-4.422)
-0.142***
(-2.994)
-0.094***
(-2.733)
0.120** (2.192)
(Diverse male 1 %)2 – – 0.002*** (4.047) 0.001*** (2.725) – –
Fem industry % 0.079***
(3.657)
0.188*** (9.716) 0.183*** (9.576) 0.149*** (7.493) 0.158*** (6.755) 0.205*** (6.442)
CEO on board -1.764*
(-1.792)
-2.361***
(-2.679)
-2.046**
(-2.373)
-1.133
(-1.175)
-2.502**
(-2.508)
-5.321***
(-2.838)
Board size 0.868***
(2.855)
0.980*** (2.737) 1.146*** (3.233) 0.483 (1.332) 0.946* (1.954) 2.124*** (3.712)
Firm age -0.498
(-0.960)
1.471 (0.753) 1.608 (0.826) 2.019 (0.895) 0.873 (0.353) 2.002 (0.680)
Employee-elected % 0.174***
(4.135)
0.064 (0.753) 0.085 (0.986) 0.027 (0.354) 0.025 (0.172) 0.217** (2.075)
Debt % -0.062**
(-2.527)
-0.018
(-0.756)
-0.021
(-0.886)
0.025 (0.935) -0.039 (-1.318) -0.012 (-0.306)
Tobin’s Q 0.642 (1.189) -0.226
(-0.808)
-0.235
(-0.841)
-0.045
(-0.145)
-0.250 (-0.786) 0.152 (0.324)
Finland 0.656 (0.355) – – – – –
Norway 13.923***
(7.202)
– – – – –
Sweden 4.403***
(2.631)
– – – – –
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country and industry
effects
Yes – – – – –
Observations 3124 3124 3124 2647 2208 916
Sample – – – – Diverse male 1
B50 %
Diverse male 1
[50 %
All models include time effects. Constant not reported. Standard errors clustered by firm. Robust t statistics in the brackets. All explanatory
variables in model 3(b) are measured at (t-1)
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1, 5, or 10 %, respectively
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All in all, these results support our Hypothesis 4, sug-
gesting that—at lower levels of diverse male board mem-
bers—a higher incidence of these directors implies a lower
incidence of female directors, which is in line with the
incumbents exhibiting resistance toward (what is perceived
as too much) diversity. However, when the share of diverse
male directors on the board becomes higher, this variable
has a positive impact on the presence of women on the
board. Looking at our coefficients in the regression models
with the squared term, the sign changes at a relatively high
level of diverse male directors, for example, at above 70 %
for the Diverse male 1 % variable, and at around 50 %
when looking exclusively at shareholder-elected male
directors (see the coefficient for the SH Diverse male 1 %
variable in model 5a, for example).
Support for Hypothesis 5a on the relevance of institu-
tional pressure is found in terms of a higher incidence of
women on boards—in comparison to Denmark, the
Table 3 Shareholder-elected female directors on Nordic Boards
Shareholder female % Non-leading shareholder female %
Model (5a) Model (5b) Model (6a) Model (6b) Model (7a) Model (7b)
Firm size 0.759**
(2.332)
0.806 (1.481) 0.547 (0.873) 1.032 (0.730) 0.929***
(3.071)
0.834 (1.515)
Capital 1.682* (1.831) – – – – –
Institutional
investors %
-0.014
(-1.219)
0.015 (1.021) 0.022 (1.287) 0.023 (0.797) -0.011
(-0.998)
0.010 (0.671)
SH Diverse male 1 % -0.096**
(-2.217)
-0.136***
(-3.472)
-0.055** (-2.172) 0.104* (1.845) -0.084**
(-2.053)
-0.107***
(-2.797)
(SH Diverse male
1 %)2
0.001**
(2.170)
0.001***
(3.314)
– – 0.001** (2.084) 0.001** (2.438)
Fem industry % 0.098***
(4.253)
0.199***
(10.006)
0.178*** (8.191) 0.219*** (4.410) 0.114***
(5.548)
0.195***
(10.161)
Female chairman – – – – -0.378
(-0.066)
-1.681
(-0.328)
Female CEO – – – – 3.086 (1.221) -0.542
(-0.185)
CEO on board -1.385
(-1.318)
-2.849***
(-3.258)
-2.791***
(-3.030)
-6.440***
(-2.855)
-2.537***
(-2.603)
-3.733***
(-4.087)
Board size 1.028***
(3.420)
1.412***
(3.755)
1.287*** (2.692) 2.154*** (3.137) 1.244***
(4.278)
1.623***
(4.460)
Firm age -0.317
(-0.610)
3.340 (1.597) 2.809 (1.133) 0.038 (0.009) -0.330
(-0.647)
3.828* (1.828)
Employee-elected % 0.093**
(2.369)
0.029 (0.322) -0.035 (-0.307) 0.242* (1.686) 0.094** (2.563) 0.035 (0.434)
Debt % -0.065**
(-2.573)
-0.022
(-0.945)
-0.033 (-1.183) 0.018 (0.428) -0.065***
(-2.599)
-0.027
(-1.145)
Tobin’s Q 0.442 (0.837) -0.124
(-0.436)
-0.159 (-0.509) 0.646 (1.140) 0.429 (0.872) 0.011 (0.041)
Finland 2.665 (1.408) – – – 2.302 (1.400) –
Norway 16.159***
(8.207)
– – – 14.848***
(8.364)
–
Sweden 5.549***
(3.254)
– – – 5.166***
(3.185)
–
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Country and industry
effects
Yes – – – Yes –
Observations 3124 3124 2476 648 3077 3077
Sample – – SH diverse male 1
B50 %
SH diverse male 1
[50 %
– –
All regressions include time effects. Constant not reported. Standard errors clustered by firm. Robust t statistics in the brackets
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1, 5, or 10 %, respectively
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reference country—in Norway and Sweden. The sizes of
the country dummy coefficients (reported in the regressions
without firm fixed effects, i.e., model 1, Table 2) are in line
with the strength of institutional pressure in the different
countries. Moreover, the time dummies (estimates not
reported for space reasons) reflect the escalation of external
pressure for greater female representation at the top levels
of business corporations. The number of female directors is
found to increase significantly after 2003, which marked
the start of more intense public debate about mandatory
female representation, particularly in Norway, but also in
the other Nordic countries. In support for Hypothesis 5b,
we find the percentage of female directors to be positively
and significantly influenced by the percentage of other
companies within the same industry that have at least one
shareholder-elected woman on their board of directors
(Fem industry %). This relation remains positive and sta-
tistically significant across the different model specifica-
tions. These results provide support for hypotheses 5a and
5b, confirming that the likelihood that a firm will comply
with the societal pressure is positively correlated to the
(perceived) strength of the pressure.
Turning to the control variables, we observe a negative
(and in most cases significant) impact of the CEO’s pres-
ence on the board on the share of women on the board of
directors. However, the readers should be cautious when
drawing conclusions about the causal effects of this vari-
able since the significance of this variable is stronger in the
fixed effects model, which only captures the companies for
which the value of this variable changed during the period
of our analysis, i.e., only in about 9 % of firm-year
observations. We find a positive but not significant rela-
tionship between firm performance (measured by
Tobin’s Q) and the percentage of women on the board. The
relationship between the percentage of women on the board
and the firm’s debt is found to be negative, although the
coefficients are not statistically significant in all model
specifications. The coefficient for the share of employee-
elected directors is also found to be statistically insignifi-
cant. The same holds for firm age.
Robustness Section
A number of robustness checks were made to support the
main results. The estimates of these robustness checks are
presented in Table 4. As a first robustness check, we esti-
mated our main model measuring the peer pressure (Hy-
pothesis 5b) by the percentage of other firms in the same
region (defined based on the countries’ postcode numbers),
country and year as the focal firms that have at least one
shareholder-elected member on their boards (Fem
region %). As for the industry-based variable used in the
main models, the coefficient for this variable is positive
and statistically significant (model 8, Table 4). In model 9a
of Table 4, we capture the diversity of male members by
two distinct variables that we include at the place of the
variable Diverse male 1 %. We consequently define a
variable for the share of foreign male directors on the board
(Foreign male %) and a variable for the standard deviation
of the male directors’ age (SD male age). Both variables
are found to have a negative and statistically significant
impact on the share of female directors on board, thereby
supporting our main results.
In model 9b of Table 4, we measure the diversity of the
existing board by an alternative variable (Diverse male
2 %). This variable differs from the one used in the main
specifications by how we define young male directors.
Specifically, in Diverse male 2 %, young male directors are
considered those whose age is one standard deviation
(approximately 9 years) lower than the average. In line
with our main regressions, the coefficient for the share of
diverse male members remains negative and statistically
significant. In model 10, Table 4, we add the square term
for the share of diverse male members, measured by (Di-
verse male 2 %)2. In line with the main specification in
Table 2, we confirm the curvilinear relationship between
the share of diverse male members on board and the share
of female directors. Models 11a and 11b in Table 4 refer to
the shareholder-elected female directors, while the depen-
dent variable in model 12 is the share of non-leading
females among all shareholder-elected members of the
board. The aim here is to replicate our main results for
shareholder-elected females, while using the alternative
definition of the shareholder-elected diverse male directors
(SH Diverse male 2 %) and its squared term (SH Diverse
male 2 %)2. Model 11a and model 12 report the OLS
estimates, while we include firm fixed effects in models
11b of Table 4. The results again support a curvilinear
relationship (U-shaped) between the share of shareholder-
elected diverse male members on board and the share of
female directors.
We also re-estimated some models e.g., model 2 in
Table 2 (estimates not reported for reasons of space) while
additionally controlling for the presence of large owners,
which we measure by the percentage of shares held by the
five largest owners in the firm (Largest five %). Given that
controlling owners provide active monitoring of a firm’s
management, these owners may find it less beneficial to
strengthen the board’s monitoring function by appointing
presumably more independent female directors. Given the
strong role these owners have played in appointing direc-
tors in the past, they might also be less willing to accept
external recommendations and pressure regarding director
recruitment. Regardless of the model specification, the
effect of ownership concentration is insignificant, while
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including this variable does not change the significance and
signs of other coefficients. As a further robustness check,
we estimated the model 2 (Table 2) and the model 5a
(Table 3) using the Tobit maximum likelihood estimator,
which specifically considers the distribution of our
dependent variable (i.e., the values are limited to 0–100).
The Tobit estimates, however, did not differ qualitatively
from the OLS estimates, i.e., all the coefficient from the
OLS specifications remain of the same sign and signifi-
cance when applying the Tobit estimator. For the sake of
Table 4 Robustness check
Female directors % Shareholder female % Non-leading
shareholder
female %
Model (8) Model (9a) Model (9b) Model (10) Model (11a) Model (11b) Model (12)
Firm size 0.735**
(2.328)
0.744
(1.411)
0.729
(1.379)
0.780
(1.545)
0.782**
(2.453)
0.769
(1.447)
0.943***
(3.166)
Capital 0.952
(1.018)
– – – 1.726*
(1.890)
– –
Institutional
investors %
-0.024**
(-2.143)
0.002
(0.164)
0.007
(0.475)
0.007
(0.484)
-0.014
(-1.217)
0.016
(1.036)
-0.011
(-0.993)
Fem region % 0.091***
(2.954)
– – – – – –
Fem industry % – 0.180***
(9.583)
0.192***
(9.866)
0.187***
(9.794)
0.097***
(4.274)
0.200***
(10.029)
0.113***
(5.541)
Diverse male 1 % -0.048***
(-2.603)
– – – – – –
Diverse male 2 % – – -0.059***
(-2.619)
-0.286***
(-6.076)
– – –
SD male age – -0.357***
(-2.610)
– – – – –
Foreign male % – -2.353***
(-4.816)
– – – – –
(Diverse male 2 %)2 – – – 0.003***
(5.630)
– – –
(SH diverse male 2 %) – – – – -0.134***
(-3.388)
-0.180***
(-4.981)
-0.122***
(-3.231)
(SH diverse male 2 %)2 – – – – 0.002***
(2.984)
0.002***
(4.802)
0.002***
(2.931)
Female chairman – – – – – – -0.626
(-0.113)
Female CEO – – – – – – 3.121
(1.247)
CEO on board -1.925**
(-1.987)
-2.616***
(-2.941)
-2.402***
(-2.697)
-2.160**
(-2.435)
-1.498
(-1.416)
-2.974***
(-3.336)
-2.645***
(-2.702)
Board size 0.924***
(3.052)
1.399***
(3.980)
0.989***
(2.775)
1.204***
(3.487)
1.054***
(3.545)
1.455***
(3.917)
1.273***
(4.406)
Firm age -0.654
(-1.274)
1.025
(0.522)
1.378
(0.713)
1.434
(0.781)
-0.312
(-0.603)
3.201
(1.577)
-0.345
(-0.682)
Employee-elected % 0.175***
(4.211)
0.090
(1.146)
0.081
(0.960)
0.113
(1.386)
0.093**
(2.379)
0.026
(0.288)
0.093**
(2.546)
Debt % -0.067***
(-2.772)
-0.014
(-0.567)
-0.018
(-0.759)
-0.019
(-0.781)
-0.067***
(-2.654)
-0.019
(-0.827)
-0.067***
(-2.682)
Tobin’s Q 0.644
(1.152)
-0.204
(-0.784)
-0.227
(-0.803)
-0.238
(-0.841)
0.443
(0.845)
-0.141
(-0.492)
0.431
(0.875)
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Country and industry
effects
Yes – – – Yes – Yes
Observations 3124 3097 3124 3124 3124 3124 3077
All regressions include time effects. Constant not reported. Standard errors clustered by firm. Robust t statistics in the brackets
***, **, * Statistical significance at 1, 5, or 10 %, respectively
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simplicity of the interpretation of the regression coeffi-
cients, we therefore report only the OLS estimates.
Finally, we estimated a model in which we looked at
how the existing board structure (in year t-1) relates to the
chance of new female appointments (in year t), for each
year during 2001–2008 (results not reported). Our depen-
dent variable was a dummy set to 1 if we observed an
increase in the number of women on the board in a given
year, and 0 otherwise. The results of this analysis, using
binary outcome maximum likelihood estimators (probit),
were consistent with the results presented in Tables 2 and
3. Specifically, a higher share of diverse male directors
(when in minority) at time (t-1) significantly reduces the
odds for new female appointments in the firm. We also
found that new female appointments followed increases in
board size, changes in the share of women in other firms in
the industry, and are more likely in the companies with a
female CEO. On the other hand, new female appointments
were found to occur significantly less frequently in firms
that already had (other) female directors, which again
confirms the overall organizational resistance to gender
diversity.
Caveats and Limitations
As one of its main contributions, the present paper inves-
tigates how the demographic characteristics of the existing
board members, which we used as a proxy for the internal
actors’ support of the traditional practices of directors’
selection, i.e., the practices currently in place at the time of
the emergence of the societal pressure for gender diversity,
impact upon the presence of women on the board of
directors. Since our data on directors were collected mostly
from the companies’ annual accounts, we only observe
three demographic characteristics: age, gender, and
nationality. While these characteristics are not exhaustive
in terms of directors’ demographics, they are the ones most
often referred to in criticisms of the traditional elite.
Moreover, the differences in so-called surface-level char-
acteristics, i.e., age, gender, and ethnicity/nationality, are
more easily detectable than are deeper dimensions such as
educational background (Kearney et al. 2009).
The age, gender, and nationality are also the ones noted
in the diversity sections of the corporate governance codes
in the Nordic countries. These three characteristics were
most often mentioned when we interviewed the board
members of nine large Nordic firms. According to one of
the interviewed directors, ‘‘if you have women present you
will get different perspectives…women contribute to a
more complete discussion and are not part of the male
culture. They put questions in another way or bring up
issues that would not have been brought up otherwise.’’
The presence of foreigners on a board was—despite having
a number of benefits—feared to cause changes in the board
atmosphere, communication difficulties, and to slow down
decision-making. Age differences were viewed as a source
of diverse perspectives and attitudes in the boardroom, and
often as proxies of differences in the directors’ background.
Altogether, these insights suggest that age, nationality, and
gender are key elements that distinguish the traditional elite
from others. A comparison of the relevance of these
characteristics with that of other, deeper characteristics,
such as directors’ education, functional experience, and
social status, to the perception of a director’s similarity to
the traditional elite is undoubtedly an interesting avenue for
future research.
We based our empirical analysis on a sample of non-
financial, publicly listed firms from four Nordic countries
during 2001–2008. While restricting our analysis to the
Nordic countries is a limitation, it also carries some
empirical advantages. First, given the historically suc-
cessful role of women in politics and society in the Nordic
region, the concern that there is a limited supply of female
candidates for board positions can to a large extent be
disregarded there, which may not be true in some other
countries. This is important, since we attribute the observed
variation in female directorships to differences in firm
demand for female directors rather than restrictions on the
supply side. Second, the Nordic countries can be seen as
having been a laboratory for diversity over the last decade.
As well as the pressure to implement more gender-bal-
anced governance structures, Nordic boards have been
subject to other influences, such as the internationalization
of financing and ownership, gradually leading to the
demographic diversification of boards in other dimensions
than gender (Oxelheim et al. 2013). These trends provided
us with sufficient variation in the dependent and explana-
tory variables, both within and between firms. The former
is particularly relevant if significant effects are to be
detected when controlling for firm fixed effects in regres-
sion analysis. Future studies could expand our evidence to
other countries, while properly accounting for the differ-
ences in the female representation in the labor force,
overall gender equality, and cultural norms shaping the role
of women in the society in question.
Discussion and Policy Implications
In the present study, we have followed the stream of
research that conceptualizes organizational compliance
with institutional pressure as a strategic choice, pioneered
by Oliver (1991), with the aim of explaining the variation
in Nordic firms’ response to the societal pressure for gen-
der-balanced boards. Our study primary contributes to the
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scholarly research on the gender diversity of the board of
directors. Existing research in this field has predominantly
focused on the effects of female directors on board
behavior and firm performance (e.g., Adams and Ferreira
2009; Nielsen and Huse 2010). Hillman et al. (2007) and
Farrell and Hersch (2005) are among the few that specifi-
cally examine the organizational predictors of the presence
of female directors. Both studies are US-based and focus
primarily on the rational explanations for companies that
want to appoint women to their boards, rather than on the
motives for corporations not to appoint women, as our
study does.
We differ from these studies in adopting the institutional
theory as the primary lens for explaining the variation in
women’s representation on corporate boards and, particu-
larly, in highlighting the role of embedded interests as a
key factor explaining the slow penetration of new practices
into firms’ boardrooms. We view the societal pressure for
the entry of female directors into a boardroom traditionally
dominated by men as an example of an externally triggered
challenge to the current practices, views and norms of the
incumbents. Based on Oliver (1991) and further advances
within the stream of research exploring the variation in the
organizations’ responses to institutional pressure (e.g.,
Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Greenwood et al. 2011;
Pache and Santos 2010), we hypothesize how those sup-
portive of the existing practices may influence the presence
of female directors in the boardroom. We borrow from the
research on minority influences in groups (e.g., Kanter
1977) to conjecture on how the resistance of those sup-
porting the status quo might vary with the minority pres-
ence of other diverse members in the organization. With
this, we add to the current theoretical understanding of the
factors explaining the slow progress of women to the
boardroom, and to the current knowledge on the likely
implications of the current societal pressure for the rela-
tionship between gender and other diversity dimensions on
the board.
In drawing conclusions on public policy, it is important
to take into account that we cannot in this study empirically
distinguish between ‘‘rational’’ (value and performance
preserving) and self-serving (value and performance
reducing) incumbents’ resistance to female board partici-
pation. Oliver (1991), for example, suggests that resistance
to new organizational demands will be particularly fierce if
they are regarded as inefficient, which may be the case also
for the traditional directors’ perception of practices leading
to demographically very diverse boards that could be
lacking some of the expertise that is currently considered
key to a director’s contribution to a board. Moreover, we
have focused on the impact of the current characteristics of
male directors on female board membership, but it is clear
that board members do not elect themselves. Shareholders
play a major role, which we have not considered in any
detail apart from the impact of institutional investors.
Finally, we have not studied the long-run dynamics of
female board participation. It seems possible that today’s
minority directors may become part of tomorrow’s domi-
nant coalition. The positive and significant relationship
between other diverse members and the presence of women
that we have observed in a subgroup of Nordic boards
dominated by non-traditional members indicates that such
a change is possible.
Regardless of these considerations, some important
policy implications can be drawn from our study. First, in
the companies with (still) traditional types of boards, we
observe a negative relationship between the presence of
diverse male directors on a board and the presence of
female directors. This suggests that, in a situation where
the external concerns over the lack of board diversity are
not fully shared with the internal actors, pressurizing for
more female directors might lead to more female directors
but not to more board diversity overall. Caution needs to be
paid, especially when societal pressure is enforced through
a legal quota. When firms are legally forced to accept a
major change in gender diversity, i.e., ensure that a certain
percentage of directors are women, while—at the same
time—still aim to maintain the dominance of the ‘‘old
elite’’ on the board, female appointments might lead to a
reduction of other dimensions of diversity on boards, such
as international board membership, and consequently to a
loss of important expertise in the boardroom. In other
words, women might squeeze out the appointment of other
diverse board members, such as younger male directors or
foreigners, while remaining only ‘‘tokens’’ in a traditional
type of board of directors. This is pretty much in line with
anecdotal evidence, or as the Economist (March 11th,
2010) cautions, ‘‘if you are a youngish man who sits on a
European corporate board, you should worry. The chances
are that your chairman wants to give your seat to a
woman.’’ Similarly, companies might appoint individuals
who satisfy a number of diversity criteria simultaneously
(e.g., a director who is young, female, and foreign) rather
than increasing the actual number of such members on the
board.
Therefore, while ensuring a stronger representation of
women on corporate boards, the pressure for gender
diversity might not succeed in achieving other aims, such
as strengthening board independence, refreshing and
improving the old norms and practices of the board elite,
and ensuring a higher presence of diverse views and
opinion in the boardroom. Instead of ‘‘token women’’ it
may therefore be more apt to talk about token diversity or
perhaps even a ‘‘diversity quota’’ covering all minority
board positions. Based on these considerations, we also
suggest that scholars investigating the impact of gender
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diversity on board behavior must properly account for the
composition of the remaining board, and any changes that
accompany new female appointments, such as decreases in
the other dimensions of board diversity.
This study indicates that most firm-specific variables,
except for firm size, board size and geographic location,
have no effect on the presence of women on boards of
directors in Nordic firms. Specifically, the presence of
institutional investors among a firm’s owners does not lead
to a higher share of women on the board. Companies
operating in industries in which women play a stronger role
do not seem to be more likely to have female directors on
their boards either. These results suggest that companies
and their investors do not (yet) anticipate significant eco-
nomic benefits from a female presence on the board of
directors. This conclusion finds support in other studies,
which observe a decline in firms’ market value following
the introduction of the gender quota law in Norway (e.g.,
Ahern and Dittmar 2012). As reported by these studies, this
may be due in part to the fact that female directors lack the
executive and other experience required for directorship.
Moreover, the gender quota law forced the Norwegian
publicly listed companies to make rather quick changes in
their board composition. Such a reshuffling of board
membership might result in a loss of firm-specific expertise
and experience, with negative implications for firm per-
formance. Thus, we advocate that countries seeking to
adopt a gender quota law should provide an adjustment
period sufficient to allow boards to comply and maintain
continuity of boardroom experience.
We do not argue for or against board gender quotas. The
results of our study and the numbers on the presence of
women among directors suggest that—in the absence of
quota laws—the organizational adaptation to societal
expectations for more female directors is likely to be slow.
This may be true even in countries with strong institutional
pressure, such as best governance practice recommenda-
tions, public appeals, threats to implement quotas, and the
like. To some, such slow change may be politically unac-
ceptable and used as a reason to instigate quotas, while
others might regard it as an efficient organizational
response to institutional forces. At any rate, regardless of
the form that the societal pressure for gender diversity
takes, transparency in the nomination process needs to be
ensured so as to reduce the likelihood of unqualified can-
didates being appointed or women crowding out other
important dimensions of diversity. In other words, policy
makers, regulators, and other institutions monitoring
organizational compliance with the new demands should
make sure that new female appointments do not only lead
to demographically diverse boards, but also to competent
boards. Moreover, to overcome some of the psychological
barriers to and negative perceptions about a female
presence in the boardroom, quotas (if implemented) and
other actions need to be supplemented by other activities
that ease female inclusion into directors’ social networks,
associations, and other institutions that cultivate the mod-
ern (post-traditional) corporate elite.
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